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Dancing-With: A Method for Poetic Social Justice 
This chapter outlines a new theoretical method, which I call “dancing-with,” emerging from the process of writing my dissertation and the book manuscript that followed it.  Defined formally, a given theorist X can be said to “dance-with” with a second theorist Y insofar as X “choreographs” an interpretation of Y which is both true to Y and Y’s historical communities, and also meaningful and actionable (i.e. facilitating social justice) for X and X’s historical communities.  In this pursuit, the method of dancing-with involves both (1) a creative “torsion” of Y’s thought (particularly in the direction of unconscious, embodied and political factors at work in Y’ texts), and (2) a resultant, sympathetic torsion of X’s thought toward Y.  In other words, X and Y “meet in the middle,” like two dancers walking onto the dance floor, to explore the promise of a flourishing artistic partnership.  In this partnership, each must attend to the way that political meanings are inscribed on the other’s raced/sexed/etc. body, both to react maximally justly, and to maximize the aesthetic movement options that can be brought into play.  As the method of dancing-with is thus modeled on an ideal comportment for improvisational social dance (such as the contemporary Latin dance called “salsa”), I envision the end-goal of dancing-with as what I call “poetic social justice.”  By this, I mean the “poetic justice” of two theorists’ mutually empowering each other for maximal social good.  Though this process is admittedly more difficult between some theorists, in part as a function of their respective embodiments and sociohistorical positions, at least a move or two together is always possible.

I.	Introduction: A Salsa Dancing Metaphor
“Aesthetic Question:  Describing aesthetics as practice and practice as aesthetics; how can it meaningfully engage the physicality of dance and the dancing body?”
The most effective way, in my view, for aesthetics to meaningfully engage the physicality of dance and dancing bodies, is to explore and foreground aesthetics’ own embodied dimensions.  The latter includes the body of the aesthetic theorist, and the material forms taken by the theory, where “material forms” means the assemblage of visual and auditory phenomena, spread on the page and filling the air (respectively).  More concretely, the first part of this exploration and foregrounding (regard the theorists’ bodies) amounts to an obligation for theorists to be transparent with our audiences about our own embodied positions, and to do the hard work of thinking through our privileges, biases, and the other epistemological advantages and disadvantages which accrue from said embodied positions.  And the second part of this exploration and foregrounding (regarding the material forms taken by the theory itself) amounts to being mindful of the look and sound of our theoretical presentations and publications, including the invitingness, jargon, inclusive vocabulary, etc., thereof, along with the pleasures and displeasures involved for our audiences and readers.  My hope is that my current chapter, and the method of “dancing-with,” successfully deploys this strategy.  
I begin by framing the method of dancing-with in terms of the salsa dance tradition by which it was inspired.  Imagine, if you will, two strangers dancing together for the first time.  Dancer X approaches Dancer Y, gesturing toward the dance floor, to which dancer Y perhaps responds with a smiling nod of acceptance.  Imagine further, and here I blend the hypothetical with the real (for reasons that will become clear shortly), that Dancer X is embodied roughly like me (a 6’3’’, 180-lb, white cismale), while Dancer Y is a 5’2”, 100-lb, cisfemale of Indian descent.  (For what it is worth, Dancer Y was one among many partners with whom I danced on a particular evening, though we later became regular partners.  And it is my policy to dance with as many different people as possible, and with a maximally-diverse set of people).  
For X to have a satisfying and effective dance with Y, one issue that they must both negotiate is their height difference, especially when X is performing what are called “leads” in the discourse of salsa—movements by the leader which both indicate and initiate other sequences of dance movements for both partners.  Additionally, both X and Y must be open to a wide range of possibilities regarding each other’s background and circumstances.  For example, for all X knows, Y might be attending her first-ever Latin dance; or she might be a professional instructor with fifteen years’ experience.  For another example, there is always the possibility (especially given the diverse and multicultural makeup of many salsa dance communities), that X and Y do not both fluent in a common language.  In fact, the only safe assumptions which X and Y can make are that, given that they have embarked upon a dance together, both will do their best to make that dance a positive experience (if only for the sake of their own individual satisfaction), and each partner will probably make at least some movements which are unfamiliar and challenging to the other.
At this point, a reader might easily misunderstand dancing-with to be a mere restatement of a postmodern strategy sometimes dubbed by critics “creative misinterpretation” (and often associated with philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault).  The difference between dancing with and the average postmodern theory, however, is that dancing-with includes a specific, value-laden comportment.  More specifically, dancing-with presupposes a kind of virtue requirement, inspired in part by the Stoic philosophers’ insistence that art of living requires a pedagogical foundation of virtue training on which to build a formal education in philosophy.  
To wit, dancing-with involves a comportment of trust and sympathy with one’s theoretical partners, grounded in the strategic positing by theorist X that theorist Y shares X’s goal of social justice.  This virtue requirement in dancing-with also derives in part from its being modeled on the world of social Latin dance.  For anyone unfamiliar with the present-day Latin dance scene in the U.S., amateur dancers gather, around once or twice per week, at a bar, restaurant, or nightclub, in an event usually lasting around four hours.  Speaking as someone who has belonged to many of these social Latin dance communities over a fifteen-year period, the goal of these communities is to make these dances flourish as much as possible, where “flourishing” includes (but is not limited to) large crowds, new people, a friendly atmosphere, and aesthetically satisfying dance encounters.  To achieve this flourishing, the average dancer must give each of her/his partners the benefit of the doubt, and act as if those partners are similarly motivated to achieve this flourishing.  The stakes for the dancers, moreover, are quite high, in that all are to some degree vulnerable—physically and mentally—to their partners, any of whom could cause injury, discomfort, and feelings of rejection, unworthiness, etc.  That we are not deterred by these high stakes, however, begins to suggest the scope of the benefits—which fortunately can be exported to the realm of theory and interpretation.

II.	The Four Positings and Virtues of Dancing-With
Dancing-with can be analyzed into four general guidelines, which I term “strategic positings.”  With this term, I draw on my new Figuration philosophy of dance, comprised of four central aspects of dance, or “Moves.”  The first of these, called “positure,” I define as “the poetically creative, politically situated, dynamic imitation of stasis.”  To elaborate, positure is (a) “poetically creative” because of its kinship to poetry via its character of positing reality, (b) “politically situated” because all movement takes place within a community with which it is reciprocally determining, and (c) “a dynamic imitation of stasis” because both philosophical accounts of the world, and also the world itself, are constant activities (which merely appear to be a static collection of stable concepts and objects, respectively).  
Given the counterintuitive nature of this last phrase, “dynamic imitation of stasis,” it might be helpful to go into a bit more detail.  The basic idea here, which is perhaps manifested most vividly in a biological register, is that many things which appear to be still or at rest are covertly engaged in a considerable amount of activity—largely invisible internal motion—which serve to maintain said static appearance.  For example, though I may appear, to an observer, to be sitting motionless in my chair, my pancreas is hard at work maintaining my blood sugar, aided by digestive processes operating on my recently-consumed lunch.  Shifting to a philosophical register, “dynamic imitation of stasis” suggests that even the most abstract theories require successive generations of embodied philosophers, to learn and transmit those theories, which process inevitably entails at least minor modifications to those theories (given the shifting historical background of philosophical education, and evolving context of competing perspectives among the transmitting philosophers).    
Zooming back out to positure as a whole, its main implication for dance is that any living animal—including any given dance partner—even when not obviously moving, is always covertly moving, at least internally, in the process of maintaining the appearance of rest.  And for philosophy, positure’s main implication is that anything taken to be completely static and secure is, in actuality, a dynamic process, albeit a chosen, participatory process that gives the appearance of immobility.  For example, the Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming presents his interpretations of Confucius’ original teachings as faithful to those teachings, even though Wang’s interpretations are in fact creative fusions between Confucianism and the Daoist and Buddhist influences that were threatening to undermine or even eclipse Confucianism in the China of Wang’s era.  Finally, for the four positings of dancing-with, the implication of positure is that these positings do not have a timeless, universal, purely factual basis or justification.  Instead, there are merely, and self-consciously, strategic, artistically creative, and politically engaged theoretical constructs (to be modified and discarded as needed).
Turning to the four positings themselves, the first is that social justice is prioritized highly enough by canonical theorists (such as Plato, Aristotle, Alfarabi, Maimonides, Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Dewey, Du Bois, Fanon, Kristeva, Irigaray, Derrida, and Judith Butler) that they “torsion” their expressions of truth.  The second positing is that social justice-promotion beyond the theorists’ original contexts requires creative interpreters.  Thirdly, said interpretations could be affirmed by great theorists if they occupied their interpreters’ embodied positions.  By this, I mean imagining canonical theorist X as living in the same time and place, and embodied in the same racial, gendered, sexual, etc., ways as theorist Y.  Imagine, for example, how Plato’s views might change if he were reincarnated in the twentieth century U.S. as a black man (like Du Bois).  Finally, the fourth positing is that this engagement requires interpreters to be open to canonical theorists’ “un-torsioned” truths.  
Another way to think of dancing-with’s four positings is as virtues which theorist X posits in theorist Y, and which correspond to the virtues required of X.  In short, in dancing-with, X posits that Y is sufficiently (1) just to prioritize social justice, (2) imaginatively farsighted to see the need for creative reinterpretation, (3) flexible to adapt theory to new information and challenges, and (4) wise to see things that are difficult to affirm in X’s era. 
Perhaps the most important, and potentially problematic, concept in these positings is torsion, so it might be helpful to elaborate it further.  To begin with, torsion’s importance might not be immediately obvious.  That importance derives in part from its connection to dance, via the centrality of the bodily torso thereto, and also from what torsion suggests about the inherent plasticity of what apparently rigid philosophical concepts.​[1]​  That is, like dancing bodies, which can rotate toroidally along the axis from their hips to shoulders, most (if not all) philosophical concepts too are sufficiently flexible to bend and rotate without being broken.  
This conceptual flexibility notwithstanding, it might be objected that my analogy between dance and philosophy analogy still breaks down, at least insofar as dancers meet on the floor to share an agreed-upon activity, whereas no such arrangement exists in the theoretical world (which activity would serve as guide and goal for the mutual torsioning).  To this, I would respond that dance is less harmonious, and philosophy is more harmonious, than we tend to assume.  Regarding the former, contemporary U.S. Latin dance spaces are filled with conflicted agendas and desires (including romantic pursuits, networking, professional dance training, and community activism), such that it is never a priori clear (form one event to the next) exactly what the dynamics and contours of an evening’s dance will be.  On the contrary, the shared vision and pursuit thereof is an ad hoc construct of the dancers.  Regarding philosophy, I am persuaded that philosophers can still get considerable traction from the fact that we have devoted our lives to the love of wisdom, despite the many forms which that love takes, and the many paths down which those different forms of life might guide us.
Even if the analogy between dance and philosophy makes sense to the reader at an epistemological level, it might still be objected that the analogy is undermined by a deep axiological flaw.  Namely, my performances of dancing-with might appear to be a one-sided activity, in which I am acting alone to coerce other theorists to bend to my biases.  To this, I would respond that the power dynamics of my interactions with these canonical theorists are complex.  For one thing, as canonical theorists they possess much more authority and credibility than I do.  In other words, there is little danger that the serious reader will be epistemologically manipulated by me into believing something false about these canonical theorists.  On the contrary, it seems much more likely that my claims will be met with the skepticism and care which are always justifiable in regard to a junior theorists’ unorthodox reinterpretation of a canonical theorist.  Additionally, my own subjectivity, thinking, and identity have been shaped, unconsciously and consciously, by the very canonical thinkers I am reinterpreting.  This entails that one cannot, in regard to my writings, make an absolute causal distinction between for example, myself and Schopenhauer.  That is, when I respond to Schopenhauer, in a sense, a later version or variation of Schopenhauer is responding to an earlier variation of him (while the original version, if that ever existed, would presumably be epistemologically closed to us, which is probably also largely true for even his peers).
I will now paraphrase these positings of dancing-with in terms of salsa, as the specific dance form that inspired it.  In connection to positing (1), the most revered social dancers are concerned about not just performing at their best, and satisfying their preferences as individual dancers, but about helping create the most flourishing dance scene possible.  In connection to positing (2), new dancers at a scene, to partner effectively with the most experienced dancers, often need the help of intermediary dancers, specifically to adjust the new dancers to the most experienced dancers’ styles.  In connection to (3), the most experienced dancers are typically appreciative of the intermediary dancers’ recruiting and upbuilding efforts.  And in connection to (4), in this process, the intermediary dancers themselves often become more sympathetic to, and accomplished in, the most experienced dancers’ styles.
Returning to the more theoretical register of dancing-with, I will now attempt to further flesh out its four positings.  Regarding the first positing, it affirms that canonical theorists, in their writings, are at least as interested in the well-being and flourishing of their communities and the world than in expressing the truth as they see it, in its most direct and unvarnished form.  If this were not the case, one would be hard-pressed to explain why so many canonical theorists engage in ethical and political speculation at all, or why the form and content of that speculation is invariably a function, in part, of their own historical, sociopolitical positions.  Think, for example, of how many theorists left their most controversial texts unpublished, or only allowed posthumous publication, or even burned their own texts (as Descartes did with his late magnum opus).  As illuminated by thinkers such as Leo Strauss and Walter Ong, every writer is torn between those two conflicting tendencies (namely, toward truth and politicized persuasion).​[2]​  For these reasons, it seems an unwarranted assumption that a given writer has given in entirely to the truth impulse.  
Building off this first point, the second positing affirms the following: canonical theorists realize that, in order to remain relevant and efficacious into their futures, they will have to rely on interpreters, and that these interpreters will be forced to see the canonical theorists’ work against heterogeneous backgrounds, which in turn requires novel interpretations, so that the original texts can remain (or become) meaningful for other, heterogeneous audiences.
In support of this second positing, the third positing affirms that, if the canonical theorists were living in their interpreters’ milieux, the canonical theorists would be willing to revise their texts in line with later developments in the arts, sciences, politics and religion.  Evidence for this amenability can be found in the fact that, in their own eras, canonical theorists tend to insist on being at the cutting edge of the knowledge and culture of their eras, defying many of the outdated, commonsensical norms of their societies.  And the significance of this point is that scholars of these canonical figures are often suspicious that reinterpretations are unfaithful to the substance of their famous texts, rather than appreciating that such reinterpretations, at hteir best, can effectively reanimate the defiantly wondrous spirits responsible for those texts.   
And the final positing affirms that interpreters of canonical theorists will possess the flexibility and open-mindedness necessary to accept that, in following the first three guidelines, interpreters will be exposed to truths that defy present-day biases.  As a consequence, this final positing affirms that interpreters will be prepared to let the canonical theorists change the interpreters’ minds—inflecting the interpreters’ own thinking and writing.  Examples of the latter include Alfarabi’s creative interpretations of Plato, Irigarary’s of Nietzsche, and Patricia Hill Collins of Foucault.  In each case, though there is considerable distance between the historical positions and embodiments of the two theorists in question, there is nevertheless sufficient power and flexibility in the interpreted theorist, combined with sufficient trust and creativity in the interpreting theorist, to sustain a dancing leap across that distance. 
Speaking of the virtues of flexibility and trust, I now conclude this section by turning from dancing-with’s four positings to the four virtues implied by those positings.  First, dancing-with requires moral imagination, in order for X to imaginatively occupy Y’s embodied position, so as to sympathize with Y’s ends.​[3]​  Second, dancing-with requires courage, in order for X to read Y against the grain of present-day conventions and fads.  Third, dancing-with requires trust, in order for X to believe that Y is willing and able to revise her/his views in light of new truths and obstacles.  And finally, dancing-with requires flexibility, in order for X to remain open to the possibility that X, X’s communities, and even X’s entire era, might be in the wrong.

III.	Dancing with Four Types of Philosophers
Having thus given a brief sketch of dancing-with, I will now attempt to flesh out one specific way I have deployed it thus far, namely in eleven journal articles bearing the subtitle, “Dancing with [a given philosopher].”  More specifically, these articles interpret the treatments of dance offered by Kierkegaard, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marcus Aurelius, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Ralph Ellison, Frantz Fanon, Arthur Danto, Nelson Goodman, and the Chilean cognitive scientist Francisco Varela.  In each case, the approach is fairly straightforward: I consider the major works of the author currently available in translation, and search for both (a) explicit references to literal and metaphorical dance, and (b) other aspects of their texts that suggest or implicate (without naming) dance.
These eleven theorists fall pretty naturally, as the reader may have noticed, into the following four distinct groupings: nineteenth-century Germanic Idealists, twentieth-century U.S. American analytic philosophers of art, twentieth-century Africana race theorists, and contemporary French feminists.  Moreover, corresponding to these four types of theorists are four kinds of torsion that occur between myself (as theorist X) and a given canonical thinker (as theorist Y).  
First, regarding the German Idealists, in writing those three articles, I became more sympathetic to their Christianity-inflected Idealist metaphysics.  This sympathy resulted from my realization that their dialectic approach could—in theory or principle—incorporate more worldly and bodily phenomenon that it did in their original practices of that approach.  In particular, the dialectic can incorporate non-straight-white-cismale bodies, as evidenced in part by the representations—albeit interstitial and marginalized—of those bodies in the canonical theorists’ texts.
Second, regarding the analytic philosophers of art, in writing those three articles, I became more sympathetic to their creation of sub-concepts through analysis, or clear and precise definitions.  This resulted from my realization that their multiplications and subdivisions of concepts could be extended even further, all the way to the logical extreme that could be characterized as a promiscuous plurality of individual beings encountered in the world.  That is, infinite analysis would asymptotically approach one concept per entity.  
Third, regarding the race theorists, I became more sympathetic to their criticisms of dance as, at least in certain contexts, facilitating racial injustice.  Simultaneously, I discovered lacunae for a positive role for dance in our post-Jim Crow context of multipronged resistance to racial injustice.  
And fourth, regarding the French feminists, I developed sympathy for their criticisms of dance as a kind of halfway measure that can undermine full bodily and verbal intimacy, especially between women and men, which can then undermine women’s liberation and gendered justice (in part by forcing painful choices for heterosexual women, such as whether to embrace one’s oppressors, endure romantic/sexual loneliness, and/or seek romantic/sexual partners that do not match one’s preferred gender).  In brief, partner dance can function as a kind of halfway measure between complete gender segregation and the fuller intimacy of intercourse and one-on-one emotional intimacy.  This resulted from my realizing that more mindful and progressive dance practices can function as regulative ideals for gendered social justice.
	To summarize these four points, in regard to all four groups of theorists, dancing-with enabled me to see greater value and flexibility in other philosophical methods (namely, dialectic, conceptual analysis, anti-racist, and feminist critiques).  And I am hopeful that my interpretations of these eleven representatives of these four groups have shown that that there is more in their work than has yet been utilized by either dance theorists or social justice activists—by showing, in short, how each of them can be persuaded to dance, even if each seems to “have two left feet.”  My assumption here is that all humans possess, in part through our evolutionary heritage, a latent desire to dance (in the broadest sense, inclusive of spontaneous and unscripted, full-bodied, joyous movement).  Evidence to this effect includes the pervasiveness of dance in social, warm-blooded, and mammalian species, as well as in young children.  
	To translate this point into more concretely dancing terms, the life of theorizing is like a social dance, at which a maximal diversity of styles might ideally be represented.  But this diversity would challenge each dancer to get comfortable with, and at least minimally competent in, as many of these styles as possible.  And in the latter process, each dancer would—albeit subtly, and primarily unconsciously—be shaping her/his own style in the direction of those diverse other dancers who are learning that style by dancing with her/him.  For my part, I am committed to discursively dancing with as many different theoretical styles as possible, and continue to find (a) those styles more amenable to mine than I initially expected, and (b) myself increasingly flexible and adaptive in transmitting those styles to others.
	My encounter is different, though, with each theorist, and it was also different with each of the four types of theorist discussed above.  The general pattern in regard to those four types is similar to another pattern I have consistently observed in fifteen years of social dance across the U.S. and overseas.  To wit, some dancers tend to be undervalued and marginalized due to their embodiment, social position, background, etc.  This is especially true of darker-skinned black women, and of phenotypically Native American people of Mexican descent.  And other dancers tend to walk cockily, attempting to colonize the dance space on behalf of their own values and styles.  This is especially true of upper class white Anglo ballroom dance instructors.  That is, the latter way of being and moving tends to intimidate those embodied differently, discouraging them from sharing the dance floor, unless those embodied differently consent to imitating (or at least appear to be trying to learn) the styles of the predominantly white professionals.  
Applying this to the realm of theory, some theorists require greater sympathetic attention, and others must be challenged and engaged more forcefully (lest one’s own movements disappear completely in their often-rigid patterns).  To use the examples of my four groups of theorists, the race and feminist theorists tend to be undervalued in U.S. academic philosophy and the Western canon, and the German Idealists and analytic philosophers of art tend toward arrogance and colonization.  Classic examples of the latter tendency include G. W. F. Hegel’s infamous pronouncements regarding Africa as the childhood of the race (whereas history and knowledge completed itself in the Germany of his era, in his person), and Nelson Goodman’s claim that Labanotation has reduced all dance to a system of movements annotatable therein.

V.	Dancing with Eleven Philosophers
	I will now discuss the specific torsions that occurred, both from myself to the canonical theorists, and from those theorists to myself.

Mutual Torsions in My Articles Subtitled “Dancing with…”

	          	       (torsions in my own thinking) 	 (torsions of the great theorists)	
German Idealists:

Kierkegaard	< Christianity can be this-worldly	> dance is central to Christianity
Hegel		< the dialectic is dance-like		> the dialectic must include women of color
Schopenhauer	< Platonic/Vedanta idealism dances	> music is inadequate without dance
Aurelius	< ethics, political, and religion fuse	> certain community dances are virtuous

Anglo-American Philosophers of Art:

Danto		< defining dance can be productive	> in art, bodies must trump interpretations
Goodman	< self-exemplification is meaningful	> dance notation per se is inadequate
Varela		< cognitive science is redeemable	> cognitive science must study dance

Africana Critical Race Theorists:

Ellison		< democracy is improvisatory		> jazz is inadequately theorized without dance
Fanon		< dance can exacerbate racism		> denigrating dance can also exacerbate racism

French Feminist Theorists:

Irigaray		< dance undermines hetero-intimacy	> dance can also ameliorate hetero-intimacy
Kristeva	< gesture can redeem psychoanalysis	> psychoanalysis must integrate dance

The left-hand column consists of specific ideas about which I changed my mind during my dance with each theorist.  And the right-hand column consists of the ideas about which (I am claiming) canonical theorists would ideally have thought differently, and about which (I am positing) they would change their minds if they were to occupy a greater range of the embodied and social positions that are represented by their current readership.  Note, however, the word “positing” here, which in my view is fundamentally imaginative and strategic act.
I will now summarize the texts in which I retroactively detected the above torsions.  Beginning with a group that I will call the Idealists (even though this is admittedly a slight stretch for Kierkegaard, and likely counterintuitive in the case of Aurelius).  In the Kierkegaard article, my torsion towards him is that Christianity can be this-worldly, and his posited torsion toward me is that dance is central to Christianity.  More specifically, my dance with Kierkegaard is grounded in the fact that dance is intimately connected to both Kierkegaard’s personal and writing life.  After exploring the limited secondary literature on dance in Kierkegaard, notable exceptions to which include the word of M. Jamie Ferreira and Edward F. Mooney, I analyze the hidden dancing dimensions of his concepts of the leap and the “shadow-dance” [Schattenspiel], and offer new interpretations of the two most dance-rich pseudonymous works, namely Repetition and Postscript.  My conclusion is that the religious for Kierkegaard is a lighthearted dance, moving as a comedic actor through the world-as-theater.
 	My second Idealist is Hegel, towards whom I bend by conceding that the dialectic is dance-like, and whom I posit as bendable toward me regarding the implication that the dialectic must include women of color.  More specifically, my dance with Hegel takes its point of departure from an overview of Hegel’s dozen or so mentions of dance in his Lectures on Aesthetics, focusing on the tension between Hegel’s denigration of dance as an “imperfect art” and his characterization of dance as a potential threat to the other arts.  On that basis, I analyze an insightful essay from Hans-Christian Lucas on the “Anthropology” section of Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, focusing on Lucas’ argument that the “Anthropology’s” crucial final sections, (importantly connected to “magic” and “animal magnetism”), threaten to undermine Hegel’s entire philosophy.  My conclusion, from my own reading of the “Anthropology,” is that Hegel has in effect quarantined dance in what he terms “the dark regions” of madness in “The Feeling Soul” section of the “Anthropology.”  Overall, I suggest that this quarantining is ultimately as problematic for Hegel as it has been for dance.  Because without dance, complete with its associations with people politically disempowered (or, in his view, underdeveloped) in their embodiment (such as women and people of color), this crucial transitional section in the “Anthropology” remains burdened with a corporeal remainder that problematizes the entire system.  Put simply, Hegel must—by his own dialectical logic—learn to dance gracefully with those whom he would rather shun.
	My third Idealist is Hegel’s self-appointed arch-nemesis, Arthur Schopenhauer, whom I try to meet through acknowledging the dance of Platonic/Vedanta idealism (which was of critical importance for Schopenhauer).  In return, I posit, as his coming to meet me, the implication in his thought that his most vaunted art form, namely music, is ultimately incomplete and inadequate without dance.  More specifically, my dance with Schopenhauer explores Schopenhauer’s position on dance, including his brief, pejorative references to it in The World as Will and Representation, and dance’s exclusion from his discussion of the arts in that text.  To understand this exclusion, I consider Francis Sparshott’s essay on the neglect of dance in the history of aesthetics, including his observation that Plato’s valorizes dance, and his comment that Schopenhauer’s dance is the death-dance of Shiva.  Seeking a stronger justification for Schopenhauer’s neglect and condemnation of dance in light of the opposite tendency in his Platonic and Vedantic influences, I suggest that Schopenhauer’s conception of madness—as a form of disconnection closely linked to genius—offers both a promising diagnosis for the problem of dance’s status, and also a remedy.  Finally, I attempt said remedy, sewing together Schopenhauer’s conceptions of embodiment and music.
	My last idealist belongs to the ancient Greco-Roman world, which the Germans famously so passionately idealized.  My own passionate leaning toward Aurelius derives from his effective fusion (on my reading of his Meditations) of the ethical, the political, and the religious.  And the reciprocal leaning I see in him is that, notwithstanding his critique of theatrical dance, at least certain community dances could be virtuous by his lights (including the mime and pantomime of the Roman Ludi Florales, rural Italian folk dances, the Atallenae farces, and the Fescennine verses).​[4]​  My point of departure here is the fact that the Meditations constitutes an important source and subject for Michel Foucault’s 1981 lectures at the Collège de France, one recurring theme of which lectures is the deployment by Hellenistic/Roman philosophers (such as Aurelius) of the practice and figure of dance.  Against that background, I offer a close reading of dance in the Meditations, followed by a survey of the secondary literature on this subject, all to show that dance performs a critical function in the construction of what I term Aurelius’ dance-like “political ethics,” composed of an ethics of patient tolerance and a politics of divine generosity.
	Turning to the three Anglo-American philosophers of art, I move toward Arthur Danto by conceding that defining dance per se can (at least in certain contexts) be productive.  And I see him approaching me through the implication in his arguments that bodies must ultimately trump interpretations as the essence of artworks.  More specifically, though Danto has long engaged with issues of embodiment, in art and beyond, neither he nor most of his interlocutors have devoted significant attention to dance, even though dance is the art form in which art and embodiment most vividly intersect.  To fill this absence, I consider Danto’s brief references to dance in his early magnum opus, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, track the changes in his philosophy of art as evidenced in his later After the End of Art and The Abuse of Beauty, and utilize Danto’s final work on the philosophy of action to suggest a new Danto-inspired definition of art, namely “apposite bodies.”
	With my second Anglo-American philosopher of art, Nelson Goodman, I compromise by agreeing that his concept of “self-exemplification” could be meaningful.  And on that assumption, I try to show that he ought to concede that dance notation per se is structurally inadequate.  By “self-exemplification,” Goodman refers to a type of expression in which a gesture serves as an example of itself.  One example is a dancer waving goodbye in a Romantic ballet, in which the waving expresses itself as a waving gesture.​[5]​  More specifically, in a close reading of his early magnum opus, Languages of Art, I first examine his example of a dance gesture as a symbol that exemplifies, in regard to which I show that self-exemplifying dance gestures are unique (among other self-exemplifying symbols) in that they are often independent and internally motivated, which I term “meta-self-exemplifying.”  This done, I retrace his analysis of dance’s relationship to notation in general, and Labanotation in particular, arguing that dance gives the false impression of being notational, making it what I call “meta-notational.”
	And my last analytic philosophers of art (and here I use the epithet loosely) are Francisco Varela and Andy Clark, cognitive scientists whose work has been invaluable in helping that field come to appreciate the art of cognition and the cognitive powers of the arts.  My dance with these thinkers is based on the position that cognitive science is, after all, redeemable (qua 4E cognitive science), but only to the extent that it makes “adequacy to dance” a necessary condition of its success.​[6]​  More specifically, I challenge the 4E community to resolve the tension between (a) its inattention to the practice of dance and (b) its utilization of the figure of dance.  To do so, I show how these two factors play out in (1) the recurring pattern of what I call “dance-resonance” in Varela et al.’s The Embodied Mind, and (2) the paradoxical presence, in Clark’s Being-There, of both frequent explicit uses “dance” and also an anxious backpedaling away from dance being important enough to challenge the adequacy of the concept of representation in cognition.
Turning to the Africana critical race theorists, Ralph Ellison is most famous for his novel Invisible Man, but is also a formidable theorist in his essays.  By Ellison I was persuaded that democracy (like salsa dance) is essentially improvisatory, as exemplified in jazz.  And I am trying to persuade Ellison scholars that he considers jazz to be inadequately theorized without its dances.  More specifically, although Ellison’s appreciation for jazz music is well known, as is his use of the bebop jam session as symbol of ideal U.S. democracy, less well-known is his passion for dance, and the extent to which it pervades his life and his masterpiece, Invisible Man.  To rectify that, I offer a reading of Invisible Man as a kind of “public jazz dance,” stressing the role of syncopation and community therein, and suggesting that an appreciation of dance in Ellison may contribute to the political efficacy of his thought by illuminating and emphasizing issues such as gender and embodiment. 
	My second Africana critical race theorist is the Caribbean-born, anti-colonialist liberation fighter Frantz Fanon.  Discouraged, I move with him by recognizing that dance can exacerbate racism, but I also beckon him toward the counterpoint that condemning dance in toto can also exacerbate racism.  More specifically, although Fanon's explicit remarks on dance are brief and negative, the similarities between his account of black embodiment in anti-black racist societies and my own phenomenology of dancing embodiment suggest the possibility of re-understanding and affirming both black embodiment and dance.  My point is not that the experiences of (various forms of) dance are forms of oppression in the same way, or to anything like the same degree, as experiences of racism.  Rather, I argue that dance (especially in its various professional forms), though for the most part a voluntary and empowering activity, bears important phenomenological resemblances to Fanon’s characterization of black embodiment in racist and colonized cultures in Black Skin, White Masks and Wretched of the Earth.  These resemblances strike me as significant in that they suggest the possibility for black persons to attempt strategic resistances to political oppression.  By this, I mean trying to, in a sense, close the gap between racist and dancing embodiment, through seeking opportunities for performative resistance and acknowledging ways in which oppression conveys significant advantages (both ethically and ontologically).
	The final subgroup I will address consists of two contemporary French feminist philosophers.  First, the Belgian-born psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray, to whom I concede, again discouraged, that dance can undermine heterosexual intimacy, but in whom I also find the possibility that dance could also help heterosexual relations improve.  To repeat, dance can cause this undermining by functioning as a kind of halfway measure between the two poles of complete separation and full sexual and emotional intimacy.  More specifically, I argue that dance functions in Irigaray’s work in three ways.  First, dance for her is a symbol of a more positive comportment for heterosexual relationships.  Second, dance in her work suggests that  the ambivalence some have noted in Irigaray’s work is self-consciously strategic.  And third, dance can tease apart the concepts of negative and positive mimesis (by fleshing out the latter).  In other words, dance constitutes a figure of positive ambivalence, whether between heterosexual lovers, participants in a philosophical dialogue, or aspects of a concept.
	Finally, Julia Kristeva is a psychoanalyst, literary critic and novelist of Bulgarian descent, towards whom I bend by conceding that psychoanalysis can be redeemed, at least in part, from its problematic tendencies by emphasizing gesture and its centrality in language.  And she appears to reciprocate that torsion in that her writing appears to support my interpretation that psychoanalysis ought to integrate dance qua foundry of non-verbal, gestural language.  More specifically, for Kristeva, dance is a practice moving across multiple borders, including those between what she calls the “semiotic” chora and the “symbolic” dimension of choreography, between the rituals of religion and art, and between the symptoms of and treatments for troubled psyches.  Due to this borderline nature, dance is particularly relevant to Kristeva’s analysis of patients with “borderline” personality disorder, potentially compensating for their allegedly problematic verbal language with dance’s somatic, gestural language, in what I render as a choreographing of the borderline soul.


VI.	Conclusion
	If these analyses hold weight, then the practice of contemporary U.S. Latin dance has a surprising amount to teach the ancient discipline of philosophy.  Everything changes if one reimagines oneself, and the theorist whom one is interpreting, to be two dancers meeting on a social dance floor.  Instead of two people separated by overwhelming distances of time, space, politics, and values—or two ruthless competitors or adversaries in the hunt for absolute truth—we instead become partners, and even potential friends.  We become united by our mutual, and natural, desire to find as much joy and meaning as possible in the process of making our shared world a better place in which to dance.  
The challenges of making this shift are great, and cannot be accomplished without some serious soul-searching, and a commitment to our own character development.  But the potential rewards are even greater.  Everyone moves differently, of course, and there is potential beauty in every variation thereof.  It is impossible, however, to imagine the details of that beauty prior to sharing a dance floor.  Please, let us do our best to be patient, and brave, and extend our hands to the most unpopular, misunderstood, and traumatized dancers in our community.  Let us invite them to join us for a twirl or two.  It’s a risk eminently worth taking.
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^1	  See, for example, Merce Cunningham’s classic dance, Torse, based on the ancient Chinese text, The Book of Changes.
^2	  I refer here to Strauss’ view, later championed by Ong, that under times of political oppression (which for members of disempowered groups is arguably every time) authors do not have the luxury of speaking their whole truth in a maximally direct way, and must instead encrypt and bury that truth.  For more on what this looks like in Strauss’ first and most famous exemplar, the medieval theorist Abu Nasr Alfarabi, see Hall 2015.  
^3	  By “moral imagination” here, I mean the systematic discipline of bracketing one’s moral judgment of another until one has made a sustained effort to imagine oneself occupying their sociohistorical position.  Crucial here are Arendt’s interpretation of Kantian reflective judgment in the political sphere, and Richard Wright’s conception of the necessary pain involved in expanding the moral imagination.  For more, see Hall 2016 and 2017.
^4	  For more on these dances, see Beacham 1991.
^5	  For more, see Hal 2015.
^6	  See Varela, Francisco, Evan T. Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.  Cambridge: MIT, 1992; and Clark, Andy.  Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.  Cambridge: MIT, 1998.
